Abstract: This paper studies FDI spatial spillovers in China. Empirical investigation reveals that, along the spatial dimension, FDI presence tends to generate negative intra-regional spillovers that dominate other potential positive externalities. The direction, magnitude and scope of inter-regional spillovers vary, depending on the spillover channels. Our empirical findings call for a rethinking of policy-driven agglomeration among indigenous firms and MNEs in developing countries.
INTRODUCTION
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) have been a major influence on the world economy and the focus of considerable attention. Such enterprises have been at the center of wide-ranging debates both within home countries and in recipient nations. In recipient nations, for example, apart from macroeconomic issues such as tax revenues, employment, exports and economic growth, it is argued that foreign direct investment (FDI) may potentially influence indigenous firms through various spillover effects (Blomström and Kokko, 1998) . Over the past two decades, both academic researchers and policy-makers have paid a great deal of attention to FDI spillovers that occur particularly in developing countries. Based on the fact that MNEs on average possess superior technologies or knowledge capital, policy-makers in developing countries seem to take it for granted that there will be beneficial spillovers from MNEs to nearby indigenous firms. Relatively little attention has been paid to the issue of potential negative spillovers. In this study, by exploiting very detailed location information of manufacturing firms in China, we provide empirical evidence showing that negative FDI spillovers can be substantial along the spatial dimension.
Many studies investigate FDI spillovers in the context of firm or industry agglomeration. This is motivated by the Marshallian notion that firms tend to agglomerate in specific areas so as to reduce transaction cost and enjoy external economies. It is well documented in the existing literature that the location of MNEs exhibits similar self-reinforcing pattern not just along the geographical but also the temporal and sectoral dimensions (see, among others, Head et al., 1995; Kwan, 2000a, 2000b; Blonigen et al., 2005; Lin and Kwan, 2011) . While this line of literature tends to gravitate on the notion that agglomeration promotes spillovers, the direction and magnitude of the association between geographical distance and spillovers, however, is not as clear as one would expect.
The knowledge diffusion literature has long documented the co-existence of both positive and negative spillovers in the context of firm agglomeration. Audretsch and Feldman (1996) and Gertler (2003) emphasize that knowledge diffusion is highly sensitive to geographical distance and that proximity promotes knowledge spillovers. Boschma and Frenken (2010) , Broekel and Boschma (2012) , and Cassi and Plunket (2013) provide empirical evidence for the prevalence of the so-called proximity paradox, which states that while proximity in various dimensions (geographical, cognitive, organizational, and social) may be a driver for agents to connect and exchange knowledge, too much proximity in any of the dimensions could result in substantially weakened or even negative innovative performance and spillovers. It has also been argued that congestion pricing may come along with agglomeration, as excess demand would boost local cost for land, labor, and even public goods, thereby generating negative pecuniary externalities onto the firms.
Consequently, while geographical proximity between MNEs and indigenous firms may facilitate knowledge diffusion and hence increase the likelihood of positive spillovers, it can also bring along negative spillovers that adversely affect the performance of indigenous firms (Görg and Greenaway, 2004; Görg and Strobl, 2005) .
Many empirical analyses in the literature treat each region as an isolated entity. The role of spatial dependence is completely ignored, even though it has been found to be an important force in the process of productivity growth (Rey and Montouri, 1999; Madriaga and Poncet, 2007) . In the context of FDI spillovers, there is no reason why MNCs located in a particular region can only generate spillovers onto indigenous firms collocated in the same region. Similarly, intra-and interregional spillovers can also occur among indigenous firms. The pitfalls of ignoring these spatial interactions, if they actually exist in the data, have also been well documented in the econometric literature (Anselin, 2001) . These considerations motivate us to employ in this study a spatial dynamic panel model with both time and spatial autoregressive terms, which simultaneously accounts for spatial interactions among indigenous firms as well as that between indigenous firms and MNEs. The model is estimated by spatial dynamic panel GMM method (Kukenova and Monteiro, 2009 ) that accounts for endogeneity and spatial dependence problems.
One of the unsolved issues in the FDI spillovers literature is the lack of consensus on the genuine mechanism of spillovers. In most early empirical studies, documented association between domestic firms' productivity performance and FDI presence at most reveal a compounded effect summarizing both positive and negative effects from various channels. To uncover the genuine spillovers realization process, this compounded net effect needs to be further decomposed by adding more dimensions into analysis. Recent literature thus increasingly look at FDI spillovers through industry linkages, origin of foreign ownership, and firm heterogeneities (see Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Javorcik, 2004; Lin et al., 2009; Crespo et al., 2009; Abraham et al., 2010; Hale and Long, 2011; Xu and Sheng, 2012, among other contributions) . In this study, we attempt to identify different channels of FDI spillovers by using geography scope. More specifically, although it might be difficult to entirely decompose mixed effects from various channels, we would like to propose that spillovers from different channels have different geography scopes and there is a possibility 4 that one source of spillover would become dominant in either narrow or wider geography scope.
As documented in the literature, on the one hand, positive knowledge spillovers (skill acquisition) are more likely through labor turnover (Kokko, 1996; Glass and Saggi, 2002) . Using worker flows data in Norway, Balsvik (2011) document that labor mobility from MNEs to nonMNEs represents a true knowledge externality. Moreover, a significant part of knowledge spillovers are through MNCs transfer their techniques, quality systems, standardization procedures to their local suppliers by providing trainings to local labors (Blomström and Kokko, 1998) . Markusen and Trofimenko (2007) document that the use of foreign experts by MNCs has substantial, although not always immediate, positive effects on the value added per worker of domestic firms. On the other hand, labor turnover could also generate negative spillovers to domestic firms when foreign firms poach local talents from their domestic counterparts. In terms of the geography scope of spillover through employment, however, the negative effect of poaching local talents are more likely to have narrow scope and are confounded locally. Knowledge spillovers through customer and supplier linkage, imitation, or the transfer of quality systems and standardization procedures nevertheless are less likely to be contained within a small area and thus may become dominant and be identified among wider geographic scope. Based on this stream of literature, we use employment of foreign firms as a proxy to capture FDI spillovers in the empirical model. 1 Our empirical results seem to support this conjecture, the dominant inter-regional spillover effect captured by employment share of FDI increase from negative to positive when we gradually increase the geographic scope.
Another potential channel for FDI spillovers is through sales competition. Similar to employment, sales competition could potentially capture both positive spillovers, i.e., domestic firms are spurred to become more efficient or to upgrade their technology due to competition (Blomström and Kokko, 1998) or negative spillovers such as market stealing or congestion pricing (Aiken and Harrison, 1999; Görg and Greenaway, 2004; Görg and Strobl, 2005) . Our empirical results reveal that negative spillovers in this case are the dominant effect in both limited and wider geographic scopes in our study. Moreover, the negative inter-regional spillovers captured by sales income share of FDI become even negative when geographic scope increases. This could be due to the fact that negative impact of market stealing or congestion pricing are magnified through inter-regional trade or industry linkages and spread out in a wider geographic scope; consequently, the positive spillovers captured by sales income share, if exist, seem to be dominated. Figure 2 . This is the main reason why the results presented in the graph are different from the common impression of TFP distribution in China. Coastal regions do on average have higher productivity but this is mainly due to the fact that many high productive FDI and Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures are located in coastal regions.
FDI presence in a locality will generate negative and significant impact on the productivity performance of domestic private firms in the same location. This result is robust to different spillover measures.
Many studies have addressed FDI spillovers in China. Using aggregate industrial data, Liu The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 discuss the empirical model, the data set and econometric issues. The empirical results can be found in Section 4. The final section concludes and suggests policy implications.
[Insert FIGURE 1 and FIGURE 2 here]
EMPIRICAL MODEL
We employ the spatial dynamic panel regression model in equation (1) as the platform for our empirical analysis, where the spatial weights w ij are inversely proportional to the Euclidean distance d ij between two regions i and j : 2,!, N and t = 1999,!, 2007. where
The dependent variable, regional TFP it in (1), is a weighted average of the firm-level total factor productivity (in logarithm) of domestic private firms in region i at time t , with the weights being the value added shares of the corresponding firms located in the underlying region in each year.
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The spatial autoregressive term, ρ w ij TFP jt j=1 N ∑ , allows productivity spillovers among domestic firms which accounts for the productivity agglomeration pattern observed in the data. The temporal autoregressive term, τTFP it−1 , introduces dynamic adjustments into the model which allows the graduate diffusion of spillover effects over time. Domestic productivity in region i will be influenced by both intra-and inter-regional FDI presence, namely, FDI located in the same region FDI _ presence it and a weighted average of FDI located in neighboring regions
The parameters β 2 and γ 2 measure intra-and inter-regional FDI spillover effect, respectively. Following the literature discussed above, we construct two proxies for FDI presence, namely, employment and sales income share of foreign firms in a region:
where the superscript ' T ' refers to all firms (both domestic and foreign) in a region, and superscript ' FDI ' refers to foreign firms only. These two proxies are expected to at least partially identify different channels of FDI spillovers, namely, (a) spillovers passing through workers (such as positive knowledge spillovers from labor market turnovers, learning-by-watching, imitation, etc. or negative spillovers from MNEs poaching local talents and bidding up local wages) and (b) spillovers passing through the product market (such as market stealing effect or competition effect).
Since we cannot rule out multiple spillover effects, possibly of opposite sign, passing through the same channel at the same time, the current setup will only be able to capture the dominant or net effect.
In view of the prominence of the state-owned sector in China and its well-documented impact on the private sector, we also include the fixed asset share of state-owned enterprises in a region as an additional explanatory variable:
where superscripts 'T ' and ' SOE ' refer to all firms and state-owned firms respectively. 5 Finally, with the aid of the panel data structure, we include two fixed effects to mitigate the problem of omitted variables. Time-specific fixed effect δ t captures macroeconomic or policy events that have nationwide impact on productivity; and region-specific fixed effect α i captures unmeasured local characteristics that explain productivity such as industry mix, institution, geography and education. Domestic private firm in this paper is defined as firms that do not receive paid-up capital from foreign investors or from any level of the Chinese government. 6 Foreign firms are firms with positive foreign equity share in the sample. 7 The dependent variable, total factor productivity at county level, is obtained by firstly estimating the total factor productivity at firm level and then aggregate them up to the county level. More specifically, we first estimate firm level TFP industry by industry using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method, which corrects for endogeneity bias in 6 This study does not attempt to address and evaluate the impact of FDI on the productivity of China's state-owned enterprises. Bearing missions like stabilizing price and mitigating unemployment, it is not appropriate to model China's state-owned enterprises have the same objective function as private firms. This issue may be investigated in future research. NBS-CIE database also reports registered ownership type which can also be used to identify firms' ownership structure. In our paper, we identify FDI by using owner's equity structure (paid-in capital) as we observe that in the databased there are firms with unchanged ownership type when their owner's equity structure actually has changed. Defining FDI using owner's equity structure thus is a better approach to reflect FDI penetration at firm level. 7 Summary statistics show that, among firms with positive foreign equity, most of them have foreign equity larger than 10%. For instance, in 1998, 97% firms of this group have foreign equity larger than 10% (OECD definition of FDI) and 87% have foreign equity larger than 25% (FDI definied by Chinese law). In 2007, the numbers are 98% and 93% respectively. As firms with foreign share less than 10% (25%) only on average account for less than 5% (10%) of our sample, we believe that this difference will not lead to a significant change in our empirical results.
DATA AND ESTIMATION ISSUES
production function estimation arising from potential correlation between input levels and unobserved firm-specific productivity shocks. County level TFP is then constructed by calculating the weighted average firm level TFP in logritham, with the weights being the value added shares of the corresponding firms located in the underlying county in each year. In Appendix I, we provide further details on the description of data and variables, as well as the estimation procedure of TFP. Kukenova and Monteiro (2009) advocate the use of the system-GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) parameter. In view of these recent developments in the econometric literature, we adopt the spatial system-GMM estimator as our estimation method in this study. Table 1 and 2 report empirical results based on two different proxies for FDI presence, i.e., sales income share and employment share, respectively. We also use different TFP measures as dependent variable to perform robustness check. 8 As shown in both tables, both estimated temporal and spatial autoregressive coefficients are positive and significant under different model specifications, suggesting fairly strong temporal and spatial self-perpetuating pattern of productivity for domestic private firms at county level. These results are consistent with the explanatory data analyses reported in Figure 2 . Positive spatial autoregressive coefficient indicates agglomeration pattern of indigenous firms' TFP while positive temporal autoregressive coefficient reveals fairly persistent self-reinforcing trend of TFP over time. 8 The difference between TFP measures 1 and 2 are mainly due to using different capital series and deflators in the firm-level TFP estimation. For TFP measure 1 we use the sum of average circulating capital and net value of fixed assets as proxy for capital input, which is deflated by investment deflators obtained from various issues of Chinese Statistics Yearbook. For TFP measure 2, both capital input and deflator follow Zhang (2012 and 2014) .
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In Table 1 , both intra-and inter-regional FDI spillovers are negative and significant across different model specifications. This suggests that negative pecuniary externalities from market stealing effect and congestion pricing seem to be dominant in both intra-and inter-regional dimensions when FDI presence is measured by sales income share. Note that when we gradually increase the number of neighbors by using different truncated spatial weight matrices, inter-regional spillovers captured by the estimated coefficient of spatially lagged FDI presence under TFP measure 1 decreases from -6.362 to -7.133, and further down to -13.093 when the spatial weight matrix is not truncated. The same pattern can be observed when TFP measure 2 is used in the regression. This result indicates that the intensity of pecuniary externalities increases when the range of neighboring regions expands. These negative pecuniary externalities seem to have wide geographic scope and outweigh other potential positive spillovers in both intra-and inter-regional dimensions. This could be due to the fact that the negative impact of market stealing or congestion pricing are magnified through inter-regional trade or industry linkages and spread onto a wider geographic scope; consequently, the positive spillovers captured by sales income share, if exist, seem to be dominated.
In Table 2 and thus contribute to the benefit of agglomeration process. Moreover, SOEs in China tend to focus on local regional market due to well-documented cellular structure of Chinese market, which could also be the reason that private firms are less affected by SOEs from neighbouring regions.
Our empirical results document fairly strong evidence of substantial negative FDI spillovers along the spatial dimension, which calls for the rethinking of the commonly made presumption of beneficial spillovers from MNEs to nearby indigenous firms. By incorporating spatial dimension in the analysis, we are able to uncover the dominance of FDI negative spillovers and their scopes in space that have not been identified in conventional regression model in the FDI spillovers literature.
Negative pecuniary externalities through market stealing effect and congestion pricing effect seem to have considerably wider scope as shown by the empirical results in Table 1 . The second sources of negative pecuniary externalities come from MNEs poaching local talents from indigenous firms in the same locality. Nevertheless, this type of negative spillovers decrease with distance as suggested by the empirical results in Table 2 . Potential benefit from FDI through knowledge spillovers are identified when we search for externalities from regions that are distance away. These results suggest that the benefit of indigenous firms locating close to MNEs may not be as large as commonly believed. Negative pecuniary externalities tend to dominate other potential positive externalities resulting in negative overall effect.
CONCLUSION
Recent literature has reached the consensus that FDI spillovers do not occur uniformly and unconditionally. Empirical studies looking at the simple association between domestic firms' productivity performance and FDI presence may only summarize the compounded effect resulting from various factors but hardly reveal the underlying mechanism. It is thus important to introduce extra dimension in the analysis so as to disentangle the FDI spillovers mechanism. This study incorporates spatial dimension and investigates the geographic extent of FDI spillovers based on a large panel dataset of Chinese manufacturing firms supplemented with GPS information down to county level. We employ spatial dynamic panel econometric techniques to uncover the spatial extent of spillover diffusion. Our empirical results show that FDI presence in one county will generate negative spillovers to domestic private firms in the same locality. This result is robust to different proxies for FDI presence. We further document strong negative pecuniary externalities through market stealing effect and congestion pricing effect in inter-regional dimension. By gradually expanding the range of the spatial weights matrix, we also identify potential positive knowledge spillovers which tend to have wide geographic scope. The construction of real capital stock merits special attention. Firms in the databased do not report fixed investment. Fixed capital stock data are reported at original purchase prices and thus cannot be used directly in the TFP estimation. We thus construct two proxies for capital input: 1)
Many developing countries including
We use the sum of average circulating capital and net value of fixed assets as proxy for capital input. 10 The firm's real capital stock in the establishment year ( rk 0 ) is obtained by deflating nk 0 using investment deflator from Perkins and Rawski (2008) . Nominal capital stock data after the establishment year is then calculated by using the estimated growth rate ( g ). Assuming a 9% depreciation rate, the real capital stock data in 1998 (or the firm's first year in the sample) is then calculated by using perpetual inventory method and Perkins and Rawski deflators. Real capital stock after 1998 (or after the firm's first year in the sample) is calculated by following perpetual inventory method with 9% depreciation rate but use the difference in firm's nominal capital stock measured at original purchase prices as fixed investment.
The first step of our data analysis is to estimate the total factor productivity in logarithm, ln(TFP) , at firm level. The county-level TFPs are constructed as the weighted average of firmlevel ln(TFP)s with the weights being the value added shares of the firm in the underlying county and in each year. Specifically, TFP it , for county i , in year t is constructed as
where va jit denotes the year t 's value added for firm j located in county i .
A conventional way to estimate TFP is to apply ordinary least squares on Cobb-Douglas production function and use Solow residue as a measure of TFP. This approach, nevertheless, has been criticized by recent literature in that it does not handle the potential endogeneity problem arising from potential correlation between input levels and unobserved firm-specific productivity shocks. Firms make input decision after they observe their current productivity level; thus, the input variables are not exogenous variables. Without controlling for firms' productivity, which is typically unavailable in most cases, OLS could result in bias in the production function regression and in TFP measure. To correct for endogeneity bias in production function estimation, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) propose to use intermediate input as instrument in the estimation. This algorithm has now commonly adopted in the literature to handle the endogeneity bias problem in TFP estimation. We hence also employ this method in this paper. The followings provide a brief summary for Levinsohn and Petrin (LP) routine.
Assume that, for a specific year t, firms in the same industry have the following production function (value added case):
where va t , l t , k t , and w t are firm's value added, labor input, capital input, and productivity, respectively. All variables are in logarithm. η t is an error term and it is assumed to be uncorrelated with all input choices. Firms will make input decision based on their productivity; thus, productivity component is correlated to input choices. Data for w t usually is not available; consequently, conventional method like OLS will lead to bias estimation, unless a proxy for productivity could be included in the regression as control variable.
To construct a proxy for unobserved productivity, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) Labor input, l t , is so-called freely variable input that firms are able to adjust when they observe current productivity shock. 3) Productivity, w t , follows a first-order Markov process, i.e.,
where ξ t is an innovation to productivity that is uncorrelated with k t , but is allowed to be correlated with l t . In this paper, we follow the default LP algorithm and assume that l t is uncorrelated with ξ t . Given these assumptions, we have
The first step of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) algorithm is to estimate the above regression function by OLS and a third-order polynomial approximation in k t and w t is used as a proxy for unobserved productivity component, i.e., the first step regression function is 
The second and the final step is to use appropriate instruments to obtain consistent estimates for keeps the closest 1/5 neighbors and weights for other neighbors are truncated to zero entries. Truncated matrix !! keeps the closest 3/5 neighbors. (f) Both TFP measure 1 and 2 are constructed by firstly estimate firm-level TFP using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) algorithm and then aggregate to county level using weighted average with the weight being the value added share of the firm in the underlying county. (g) The difference between TFP measure 1 and 2 are mainly due to using different capital input and deflators in the process of firm-level TFP estimation. For TFP measure 1 we use the sum of average circulating capital and net value of fixed assets as proxy for capital input, which is deflated by investment deflators obtained from various issues of Chinese Statistics Yearbook. For TFP measure 2, both capital input and deflator follow Zhang (2012 and 2014) . Firms with missing or negative net capital stock at original purchase prices or with number of employee less than 8 are dropped before the estimation of TFP measure 2. This results in a smaller sample size. See Appendix A for further explanation. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) algorithm and then aggregate to county level using weighted average with the weight being the value added share of the firm in the underlying county. (g) The difference between TFP measure 1 and 2 are mainly due to using different capital input and deflators in the process of firm-level TFP estimation. For TFP measure 1 we use the sum of average circulating capital and net value of fixed assets as proxy for capital input, which is deflated by investment deflators obtained from various issues of Chinese Statistics Yearbook. For TFP measure 2, both capital input and deflator follow Zhang (2012 and 2014) . Firms with missing or negative net capital stock at original purchase prices or with number of employee less than 8 are dropped before the estimation of TFP measure 2. This results in a smaller sample size. See Appendix A for further explanation.
FIGURE 1 FDI Spatial Density Distribution at County Level in 2007
Source: Authors' calculation based on NBS-CIE database. FDI density is measured by fixed asset share of FDI in each county, i.e., the value of fixed asset of foreign firms divided by the total fixed asset in a county. The color code on the map indicates the classes of density, with the darkest color corresponding to the class of the highest density.
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FIGURE 2 TFP Spatial Distribution of Chinese Domestic Private Firms in 2007
Source: Authors' calculation based on NBS-CIE database. County level TFPs are constructed as the weighted average of firm-level ln(TFP)s with the weights being the value added shares of the firm in the underlying county. The color code on the map indicates the level of TFP, with the darkest color corresponding to the class of the highest TFP.
